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INTRODUCTION
Elections have consequences. In the 2010 U.S. midterm elections, the
Republican Party made historic congressional gains.1 After the election,
much political discourse focused on the incoming battle between the new
Republican Congress and President Barack Obama.2 Yet the midterm
results affected much more than the presidential agenda, as the
Republican Party also achieved impressive state-level gains that resulted
LL.M. in Taxation Candidate, 2017; J.D., 2016, University of Florida Levin College of
Law; B.A. in Economics and Classical Studies, 2013, University of Florida. I would like to thank
all my family and friends for their immense support as well as the editors of the Florida Law
Review for their tireless efforts.
1. James E. Campbell, The Midterm Landslide of 2010: A Triple Wave Election, FORUM,
Dec. 2010, at 1, 1, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.421.1773&rep=rep
1&type=pdf.
2. See, e.g., Paul Harris & Ewen MacAskill, US Midterm Election Results Herald New
Political Era as Republicans Take House, GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2010, 12:22 PM), http://www.the
guardian.com/world/2010/nov/03/us-midterm-election-results-tea-party.
*
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in control of many legislative chambers nationwide.3 These sweeping
state-level gains did not affect policy alone. The Democratic Party—and
the Republican Party in several “blue” states4—paid a drastic price: the
gerrymandered results of the 2010 decennial redistricting cycle.5
As a partisan tool, gerrymandering refers to drawing electoral districts
“in a manner that intentionally discriminates against a political party.”6
Although the practice of gerrymandering is historically common, state
legislatures arguably gerrymandered to an even higher degree during the
2010 redistricting cycle.7 Not all states face gerrymandering issues,
however. In fact, several states have curtailed legislative gerrymandering
while others have completely removed the legislature’s redistricting
power. For example, Florida voters approved a ballot proposal amending
the state’s constitution to set strict guidelines on the legislature’s
redistricting.8 In California, a voter initiative established an independent
redistricting commission to combat problems associated with
3. Campbell, supra note 1, at 1.
4. The Republicans did not sweep every competitive state race in 2010. For example, the
incumbent Democratic governor of Illinois survived a Republican challenge in a very close race.
JOHN S. JACKSON, PAUL SIMON PUB. POLICY INST., THE 2010 ELECTIONS: ILLINOIS STILL BLUE
DESPITE THE RED WAVE THAT SWEPT THE NATION 2 (2011), http://paulsimoninstitute.siu.edu/_com
mon/documents/simon-review/paper-22-final.pdf. This resulted in several Republican members
of the Illinois congressional delegation receiving politically unfriendly districts. See James
Warren, Redistricting Squeezes G.O.P. Class of 2010, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/us/10cncwarren.html.
5. Several prognosticators warned of these consequences before the midterm election. See,
e.g., Mara Liasson, Midterm Elections Play Major Role in Redistricting, NPR (Sept. 21, 2010,
4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130011228; Peter Roff,
Election 2010 Redistricting Gains Will Give GOP Lasting Majority, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 28, 2010,
9:20 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2010/09/28/election-2010-redistrict
ing-gains-will-give-gop-lasting-majority.
6. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, at 115 (2009);
accord Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REV. 403, 405 (1993).
Gerrymandering can also encompass drawing district lines to discriminate against a certain
minority group. Howard M. Shapiro, Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering
and the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 189, 189–90 (1984). For this Comment’s purposes,
gerrymandering does not encompass racial gerrymandering.
7. See Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/309084/.
8. J. Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform to Rein
in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 557 (2011). The Florida Constitution
now mandates that “[i]n establishing congressional district boundaries[,] [n]o apportionment plan
[by the legislature] . . . shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an
incumbent; and . . . districts shall be . . . nearly equal in population[,] . . . compact[,] and . . . where
feasible, utilize existing political and geographical boundaries.” FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 20. This
amendment has curbed extensive gerrymandering in Florida. After extensive litigation, the Florida
Supreme Court struck down several congressional districts that the Florida legislature drew
following the 2010 redistricting cycle. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So.
3d 363, 413–14 (Fla. 2015).
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gerrymandering.9
Some observers likened California’s commission to the one Arizona
voters enacted almost a decade before,10 the Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission (AIRC).11 However, these two commissions
had one key difference: Arizona’s initiative authorized legislative party
leaders to appoint members onto the AIRC,12 making it inherently more
partisan. While some heralded the initiative as “the most advanced
citizen-based approach” to redistricting when enacted,13 this wrinkle of
partisan appointment was controversial and almost led to the destruction
of all independent redistricting reform. After the 2010 redistricting
process in Arizona, the AIRC’s debatably partisan map aided Democratic
candidates in winning additional seats the following election.14 Angered,
various Republicans attacked the AIRC commissioners as biased and
“unaccountable to the people.”15 In turn, the growing crescendo of attacks
resulted in a massive legal battle between the Arizona legislature and the
AIRC that would culminate in a narrow five-to-four decision—Arizona
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.16
In June 2012, the Arizona legislature sued the AIRC and its members,
arguing that Proposition 106—the voter initiative creating the AIRC—
9. See Karin Mac Donald, Adventures in Redistricting: A Look at the California
Redistricting Commission, 11 ELECTION L.J. 472, 474–75 (2012). Subsequently, another
proposition added congressional redistricting to the scope of the commission. Id. at 477.
10. See, e.g., RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE DRAW THE LINES: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE CALIFORNIA CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE 2 (2013), https://cavotes.org/sites/default/
files/jobs/RedistrictingCommission%20Report6122013.pdf; Aaron Blake, California-Size
Overhaul Not Likely with Arizona Redistricting Commission, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Aug. 17, 2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/california-size-overhaul-not-likely-with-arizona
-redistricting-commission/2011/08/17/gIQAZyqbLJ_blog.html; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court
Rebuffs Lawmakers over Independent Redistricting Panel, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/us/supreme-court-upholds-creation-of-arizona-redistricting-com
mission.html.
11. See SONENSHEIN, supra note 10, at 2 n.5.
12. See id. at 2 n.5, 12. In contrast, California’s Citizens Redistricting Committee was
created to “weed out those with conflicts of interest and strong partisan affiliation, and find
qualified candidates” in its selection process. Mac Donald, supra note 9, at 475.
13. SONENSHEIN, supra note 10, at 11.
14. See Samantha Lachman, Supreme Court Upholds Arizona’s Independent Redistricting
Committee, HUFFPOST POL. (June 29, 2015, 10:28 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/
06/29/arizona-redistricting-supreme-court_n_7470488.html. For an overview of the redrawn
districts, see Final Congressional & Legislative Maps Adopted 1.17.2012, ARIZ. INDEP.
REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://azredistricting.org/Maps/Final-Maps/default.asp (last visited
Aug. 9, 2016).
15. Lachman, supra note 14; accord Mary Jo Pitzl, Arizona Redistricting Case Nearing a
Decision, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Mar. 29, 2013, 10:39 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/
articles/20130329arizona-redistricting-case-nearing-decision.html.
16. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
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was unconstitutional.17 A three-judge panel ruled that the legislature had
standing by showing “its loss of redistricting power constitute[d] a
concrete injury,” but dismissed the claims that the AIRC’s existence was
unconstitutional.18 Subsequently, the Supreme Court accepted
jurisdiction on the case.19 Many worried that the Court would invalidate
all redistricting reform that did not originate in a state legislature.20
During the case’s oral argument,21 the Court appeared to be narrowly
divided on the actual merits, i.e. whether the word “legislature,” as used
in the U.S. Constitution’s Election Clause, literally meant that only the
legislature could draw congressional districts.22 If the Court had ruled in
favor of this interpretation, it would not only have struck down the AIRC,
but other states’ redistricting committees as well.23
This Comment discusses how the Arizona State Legislature majority
reached its decision to uphold independent redistricting commissions,
addresses issues that several of the dissenters raised, and analyzes how
the decision will impact partisan gerrymandering and future redistricting
reform. Part I briefly overviews reapportionment, gerrymandering, and
redistricting reform. Part II then examines Arizona State Legislature and
provides the legal and political context for the nearly five-year debate
over the AIRC. Finally, Part III explores potential legal and policy
ramifications of the decision on the future of partisan gerrymandering and
redistricting reform.

17. Id. at 2662.
18. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047,
1050, 1056 (D. Ariz. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2652.
19. David G. Savage, Supreme Court to Review Independent Redistricting Commissions,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2014, 4:21 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-court-redistricting20141003-story.html.
20. In fact, some House members even introduced a bill to preempt the Court. See The
Citizen’s Districts Preservation Act, H.R. 2501, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015).
21. Transcript of Oral Argument, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-1314_q8l1.pdf.
22. See Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Seems Divided over Independent Redistricting
Commissions, NPR (Mar. 3, 2015, 12:49 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/02/390245031/highcourt-case-tests-independent-redistricting-commissions.
23. See Jessica Taylor, One-Third of Congressional Districts Could Be Affected by Supreme
Court Ruling, NPR (June 28, 2015, 7:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/06/28/41
7530683/one-third-of-congressional-districts-could-be-affected-by-supreme-court-ruling; see
also Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2662 (discussing how “[s]everal other States, as a means to
curtail partisan gerrymandering, have also provided for the participation of commissions in
redistricting”).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss5/9

4

Woods: Gerrymandering (Almost) Gone Wild: How the Supreme Court Saved In

2016]

GERRYMANDERING (ALMOST) GONE WILD

1513

I. CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT, GERRYMANDERING, AND
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING IN A NUTSHELL
Since the Constitution’s ratification, state legislatures have held the
power to redistrict the House of Representatives. There is a constitutional
mandate to apportion representatives “according to their respective
Numbers, which shall be determined by [the U.S. population],” and that
the reapportionment of districts “shall be made . . . every . . . ten Years.”24
Congress fulfills this duty via the U.S. Census, which collects data
decennially to reallocate districts among the fifty states.25 Traditionally,
state legislatures exercised the power to redistrict once district
reapportionment occurred. The U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature.”26
Commonly referred to as the Elections Clause,27 the Constitution has
historically authorized state legislatures to redraw—or in some cases, to
choose not to redraw28—congressional seats. In modern redistricting
cycles, the Supreme Court has mandated equal-population voting districts
and enforced requirements of the Voting Rights Act to provide equal
opportunity for minority populations.29
Likewise, politically motivated gerrymandering has existed since the
Constitution authorized legislatures to redistrict.30 In recent years,
however, political parties have increasingly manipulated redistricting
rules for their own benefit.31 To combat this, many states saw efforts to
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
25. See 13 U.S.C. § 141 (2012). For a discussion of the U.S. Census’s evolution, see
generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 6, at 7–21.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
27. E.g., Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2659 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4).
28. Draper, supra note 7 (“[S]everal states, for much of the 20th century, [did not] bother
to adjust their district boundaries at all.”). The Supreme Court ruled this practice of not
redistricting, or alternatively not providing equal population for congressional districts if at all
possible, as unconstitutional. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734 (1983).
29. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 6, at 29, 54.
30. Michael D. McDonald & Robin E. Best, Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics and
Law: A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases, 14 ELECTION L.J. 312, 312 (2015) (“Gerrymandering has
been part of American political lexicon and landscape for more than two centuries.”); Draper,
supra note 7 (noting the Virginia legislature’s 1788 gerrymandering of Virginia’s fifth
congressional district to set up a political battle between future Presidents James Madison and
James Monroe). The actual term “gerrymandering” was coined after Madison’s Vice President,
Elbridge Gerry, “presided over a redrawing of [Massachusetts] so blatant in its partisan
manipulations that the . . . shape of one . . . district resembled a salamander.” Id.
31. Chad Flanders, Election Law Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1369, 1379–
80 (2012) (observing the “increasing efficiency” of partisan gerrymandering); see also Conner
Johnston, Comment, Proportional Voting Through the Elections Clause: Protecting Voting Rights
Post-Shelby County, 62 UCLA L. REV. 236, 253–57 (2015) (describing how parties use the
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enact various types of redistricting reform. Proposals and goals of those
advocating for reform often included factors such as “greater
transparency, . . . third-party map submissions, citizen approval [by]
direct [vote], careful vetting for conflict of interest, [and] partisan and
racial balance,” as well as “neutral criteria” including geographic
considerations.32
However, enacting redistricting reform via initiative has not been very
successful historically.33 Even as late as 2005, independent redistricting
had suffered several voter-based setbacks.34 Yet reform-minded
redistricting activists became even more vocal in their support for
independent proposals.35 Some states, like Florida, enacted guidelines
restricting legislatures from excessive partisan gerrymandering while
urging the use of neutral criteria.36 Other states directly removed the
redistricting power from the legislature. For instance, in Iowa, the
authority to redistrict congressional and state districts lies with
“nonpartisan, administrative agency of the [Iowa] legislature,” which
draws the districts without access to data regarding incumbency or
political preferences.37 Voters in Arizona and California took a further
step by enacting independent redistricting commissions, which some
heralded as the “boldest departure[] from the traditional legislative
redistricting model” for including many of the factors advocates desired
for an ideal redistricting reform package.38 These efforts reflect a growing
Voting Rights Act to create partisan gerrymanders); Draper, supra note 7 (noting how computer
software enables partisan gerrymanders to be much more accurate).
32. See Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE
L.J. 1808, 1812 (2012).
33. Barbara Norrander & Jay Wendland, Redistricting in Arizona, in REAPPORTIONMENT
AND REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 180 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011) (“[There were] failures in eight
out of the 12 attempts to use the initiative process to create independent redistricting commissions
between 1936 and 2005.”).
34. See Michael S. Kang, De-rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of
Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 667 (2006) (referencing the voter rejection of
commission proposals in both California and Ohio). Ironically, voters in these same states later
approved redistricting reform when new proposals were placed on the ballot. See Mac Donald,
supra note 9, at 474, 477; Jim Siegel, Voters Approve Issue to Reform Ohio’s Redistricting
Process, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Nov. 4, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/
stories/public/2015/election/ohio-state-issue-1-redistricting.html.
35. See, e.g., Model State Redistricting Reform Criteria, FAIRVOTE.ORG, http://www.fairvot
e.org/redistricting#model_state_redistricting_reform_criteria (last visited Aug. 9, 2016).
36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
37. Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837,
848 (1997); see also Tracy Jan, Iowa Keeping Partisanship off the Map, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 8,
2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/12/08/iowa-redistricting-takes-partisanship
-out-mapmaking/efehCnJvNtLMIAFSQ8gp7I/story.html (discussing the effects of Iowa’s redistricting
system).
38. Cain, supra note 32, at 1812.
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trend of states moving toward independent redistricting reform, but
reform efforts soon faced an existential challenge.
II. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES
While several redistricting issues, such as racial gerrymandering, are
frequently litigated,39 many questions regarding partisan gerrymandering
remain unsettled.40 Given this uncertainty, voters have increasingly
limited or removed their state legislatures’ power to redistrict. In 2011,
one of the most controversial redistricting reform vehicles was the AIRC,
which almost immediately rankled the Arizona legislature.41 Although
unsurprising, given other recent controversies involving the Arizona
legislature,42 this conflict ultimately resulted in litigation that led to the
Supreme Court resolving one of the questions concerning partisan
gerrymandering: whether the Constitution prohibits all non-legislative
redistricting.43
A. Much Ado About a Commission
Even before the AIRC, the Arizona legislature frequently faced
litigation over the redistricting plans it enacted.44 In response, in 2000,
Arizona voters approved Proposition 106, a redistricting-reform ballot
initiative.45 Proposition 106 amended the Arizona constitution to set
standards for the newly established AIRC.46 According to these
standards, legislative party leaders select four commission members from

39. This is not to say that the law regarding racial gerrymandering and the Voting Rights
Act is settled. Most recently, in Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court invalidated the
Voting Rights Act’s coverage provision, which effectively ended the preclearance procedure for
determining whether a redistricting map was a racial gerrymander ahead of time. See 133 S. Ct.
2612, 2631 (2013).
40. McDonald & Best, supra note 30, at 312.
41. See Marc Lacey, Arizona Governor and Senate Oust Redistricting Leader, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/us/chairwoman-of-arizona-redistrictingcommission-ousted.html (discussing the ouster of one of the five AIRC commissioners).
42. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (holding that federal law
preempted several provisions of Arizona’s controversial S.B. 1070); Pratheepan Gulasekaram &
S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The President and Immigration Federalism, 68 FLA. L. REV. 101, 105
(2015).
43. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2671
(2015).
44. See Cain, supra note 32, at 1830–31 (noting issues with the legislature’s maps in three
different redistricting cycles).
45. Id. at 1831.
46. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 9

1516

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

a citizen pool of twenty-five finalists.47 In turn, these members select a
chairperson not “registered with any party already represented on the
[AIRC]” from the pool.48 In redistricting, the AIRC must create equalpopulation districts, ensure political competitiveness, preserve
communities of interest, and take into account several geographic
considerations.49 The AIRC only suffered minimal setbacks in its initial
redistricting cycle.50
During the next redistricting cycle, however, the AIRC’s selection
process received much more scrutiny.51 Controversy quickly arose after
the selection of the “independent” chairperson, Colleen Mathis.52
Although registered as an independent, Mathis’s husband had
Democratic affiliations, raising questions about Mathis’s actual
impartiality.53 Arizona Republican leaders accused her of improper
conduct and “skewing the redistricting process toward Democrats.”54
After the maps’ release, Mathis was ousted from the AIRC for “gross
misconduct.”55 Nonetheless, the Arizona Supreme Court reinstated
Mathis,56 which led to the commission subsequently approving similarly
drawn maps.57
Unable to alter the AIRC’s composition, the Arizona legislature sued
in federal court.58 The legislature alleged that creating the AIRC violated
47. Id. § 1(3)–(5).
48. Id. § 1(8).
49. Id. § 1(14). Like all other states, the AIRC must comply with the Voting Rights Act. Id.
50. See Cain, supra note 32, at 1832. The AIRC’s map was challenged on the grounds that
it did not create enough “competitive districts,” but the case was dismissed because the petitioner
failed to “meet its burden of establishing that the [2001] plan lack[ed] a reasonable basis.” Ariz.
Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 208 P.3d 676, 682,
689 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc).
51. See Evan Wyloge, Critics Say Partisan Fights Take New Shape in ‘Independent’
Redistricting, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (Mar. 15, 2011, 11:46 AM), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/
2011/03/15/critics-say-partisan-fight-takes-new-shape-in-indepe
ndent-redistricting/.
52. Lacey, supra note 41.
53. Marc Lacey, Arizona Redistricting Panel Is Under Attack, Even Before Its Work Is
Done, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/us/04redistrict.html.
54. Lacey, supra note 41; accord Mary Jo Pitzl, Arizona Redistricting Chief Ousted, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (Nov. 2, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/election/azelections/articles
/2011/11/01/20111101arizona-redistricting-brewer-wants-chair-Mathis-removed.html.
55. Pitzl, supra note 54. An Arizona governor may only remove an AIRC member “for
substantial neglect of duty, gross misconduct in office, or inability to discharge the duties of
office,” and two-thirds of the Arizona Senate must concur. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(10).
56. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n v. Brewer, 275 P.3d 1267, 1278 (Ariz. 2012).
57. Alex Isenstadt, Colleen Mathis’s Revenge, POLITICO: DAVID CATANESE BLOG (Dec. 20,
2011, 10:23 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/david-catanese/2011/12/colleen-mathiss-revenge108259.
58. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2662
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the Constitution’s Elections Clause, as voters were controlling
redistricting instead of state legislators.59 More specifically, the crux of
the legislature’s argument was that “[t]he word ‘Legislature’ in the
Elections Clause [only meant] the representative body which makes the
laws of the people,” meaning “[n]o State can constitutionally divest its
Legislature entirely of the redistricting authority.”60 After recognizing
that the Arizona legislature had standing,61 a federal district court held
that the Elections Clause permitted the AIRC’s creation, as Arizona’s
“lawmaking power plainly includes the power to enact laws through
[voter] initiative.”62 The district court also affirmed a broader
interpretation of “Legislature” in the Elections Clause.63 After this ruling,
the Supreme Court postponed jurisdiction and addressed the matter.64
B. “Legislature” Means More than Legislature
This Comment centers its analysis on the Elections Clause discussion
in Arizona State Legislature rather than on the standing discussion.65
First, the Supreme Court provided much-needed clarity on its views
concerning partisan gerrymandering. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
author of the opinion, explicitly recognized that “[p]artisan
gerrymanders . . . [are incompatible] with democratic principles,” setting
(2015).
59. See Brief for Appellant at 42, 47, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314).
60. Joint Appendix at 21, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314).
61. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047,
1050 (D. Ariz. 2014) (“[The Arizona legislature’s] loss of redistricting power constitute[d] a
concrete injury.”), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2652.
62. Id. at 1056. One judge dissented on this point, believing that the AIRC
unconstitutionally denied the Arizona legislature “the ability to have any outcome-defining effect
on the congressional redistricting process.” Id. at 1058 (Rosenblatt, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
63. See id. at 1055–56 (majority opinion) (“The Supreme Court’s decisions . . . ‘provided a
clear and unambiguous answer . . . twice explaining that the term “Legislature” in the Elections
Clause refers not just to a state’s legislative body but more broadly to the entire lawmaking process
of the state.’” (quoting Brown v. Sec’y of State, 668 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2012)).
Incidentally, Brown upheld the Fair Districts Florida initiative, or Amendment Six, against a
challenge that it was procedurally and substantively unconstitutional. See Brown, 668 F.3d at
1285.
64. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2659.
65. The majority also thoroughly discussed whether the Arizona legislature possessed
standing and determined that there was an “injury in the form of [an] ‘invasion of a legally
protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent.’” Id. at 2663
(quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997)). The Court noted that
the alleged injury was not “premature, nor . . . too ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’ to establish
standing,” as any attempt to enact a competing plan would immediately conflict with the Arizona
constitution. Id. at 2663–64 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
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the tone for the rest of the decision.66 The majority then proceeded to
deduce principles from relevant precedent, first noting that precedent
established that “the word [Legislature] encompassed a veto power
lodged in the people,” not just the representative body.67 The Court then
analyzed other early precedent to differentiate various uses of the term
“Legislature” in the Constitution, distinguishing the “lawmaking”
function of state legislatures from their other constitutional functions.68
The Court noted that, normally, lawmaking “must be in accordance with
the method which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments” and
further that the Elections Clause did not “endow the legislature of the
State with power to enact laws in any manner other than that . . . [State’s]
constitution.”69 Justice Ginsburg strategically distinguished the concept
of lawmaking from just a legislative body here. Her discussion previously
examined Arizona’s constitutionally approved voter-initiative process,
showing that it was a form of lawmaking, and thus constitutional.70 In
this manner, the majority demonstrated that a state constitution may grant
lawmaking power to a non-legislative party, whether an executive or a
state’s citizens.71
Next, the majority addressed one of the dissenting arguments 72: If
“Legislature” in the Constitution encompasses more than just state
legislatures, and even includes a state’s citizens, why was the Seventeenth
Amendment even necessary, since that amendment’s purpose was to
enable “the people” rather than “‘the Legislature’ of each state” to elect
senators, as originally prescribed by the Constitution?73 In other words,
why was it necessary to transfer this power from the state legislatures to
the people if the term “Legislature” includes the people? In light of its
previous discussion, the majority dismissed this argument,74 citing
precedent stating that “legislature” has several meanings within the U.S.

66. Id. at 2658 (second alteration in original) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292
(2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).
67. Id. at 2666.
68. See id. at 2666–67.
69. Id. at 2667 (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 367–68 (1932)).
70. See id. at 2660–61 (noting that the Arizona constitution established Arizona voters on
“equal footing” with the Arizona legislature).
71. Compare id. (discussing voter-initiative power to establish a redistricting commission),
with Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366, 368 (upholding the Minnesota governor’s veto power on
redistricting maps).
72. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2667–68.
73. See id. at 2677–78, 2681 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2667–68 (majority opinion) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3).
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Constitution.75 Ultimately, the Court held that there was “no
constitutional barrier” to lawmaking via voter initiative.76
After rejecting the claim that the Elections Clause conflicted with a
federal statute permitting Congress to adopt redistricting maps without
legislative involvement,77 the majority turned to whether the AIRC was
constitutional. Affirming the lower court’s decision, the Court held that
Arizona voters could enact redistricting reform via independent
commissions without violating the Elections Clause.78 Again noting
Arizona’s constitution permitted lawmaking via voter initiative, the
majority determined that “the people,” similarly to a legislative body,
may delegate their lawmaking power to an independent redistricting
commission.79
Turning to the Elections Clause, the majority declared its central
purposes to be “‘the Framers’ insurance against . . . a State [refusing] to
provide [congressional] election[s]’ . . . . [and] to act as a safeguard
against manipulation of electoral rules by politicians . . . to entrench
themselves or place their interests over those of the electorate.”80 Thus,
the Elections Clause cannot be reasonably interpreted to prevent a state
from allocating lawmaking power to “the people,” as that interpretation
would run contrary to the historic role of “States as laboratories.”81
Finally, the majority warned that the dissent’s interpretation would
invalidate all initiative-enacted redistricting commissions and that a wide
array of other initiatives enacted via the people’s lawmaking ability
would likely suffer the same fate.82 Invoking the ideals of direct
democracy,83 the majority adopted a legally sound and practical solution
to the controversy.
75. Id. at 2668. Later, the majority pointed out that even during the founding, several
dictionaries defined “legislature” as encompassing all lawmaking power. See id. at 2671
(discussing early dictionary definitions of “legislation”).
76. Id. at 2668.
77. See id. at 2668–71 (dissecting the legislature’s arguments against a federal statute with
the provision’s legislative background and prior Court precedent).
78. Id. at 2671.
79. Id. at 2671–72. At oral argument, the Arizona legislature’s counsel conceded that a
legislature could delegate its redistricting power to a commission. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 21, at 15–16.
80. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2672 (quoting Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of
Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013)) (deriving support from both the Federalist Papers and
James Madison’s discussions of the Elections Clause).
81. Id. at 2672–73 (quoting Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009)).
82. Id. at 2676–77 (noting that popular initiatives regulating voter registration and straightticket voting as well as “[c]ore aspects of the electoral process” in state constitutions, which were
ratified by convention as opposed to state legislatures, would be endangered).
83. See id. at 2677.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 9

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

1520

[Vol. 68

C. The Dissent’s Pre-Seventeenth Amendment Interpretation of
“the Legislature”
While Arizona State Legislature produced three detailed dissents
attacking the majority’s various positions, this Comment focuses on
Chief Justice John Roberts’s dissent discussing the Elections Clause.84
His dissent first invoked the Seventeenth Amendment before
sarcastically criticizing its drafters for not just interpreting “the
Legislature” in Article I, Section 3, as “the people.”85 Claiming the
majority’s interpretation ignored supportive evidence, the Chief Justice
criticized the historical sources—“founding era dictionaries”—the
majority used to construe “legislature,” while relying on other historical
sources to support a strict textualism interpretation of the term.86 Yet the
claim that “any ambiguity about the meaning of ‘the Legislature’ is
removed” when presented with other founding-era sources is puzzling,87
given the existence of separate historical schools of thought on the term’s
actual definition.88 The dissent further argued that the majority was
amending the Elections Clause “by judicial decision.”89
Chief Justice Roberts’s strongest argument focused on the Court’s
previous invalidation of provisions in state constitutions imposing term
limits on federal representatives, although those limits would give the
people more control over their representation.90 While an interesting
analogy, the Constitution’s Qualifications Clauses are much less
ambiguous than the Elections Clause and pertain to an almost exclusively
federal domain.91 Additionally, using a case decided by the House
Elections Committee in 1866, his dissent argued that state legislatures
84. Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas also condemned the majority’s
interpretation of the Elections Clause. See id. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deriding the
majority’s interpretation of “legislature”); id. at 2697–99 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dismissing the
Court’s tradition of ballot initiatives as inconsistent while viewing the majority’s support for the
AIRC as “faux federalism”). Both dissents also discussed standing and federalism issues beyond
this Comment’s scope.
85. See id. at 2677 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended
by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII).
86. Id. at 2679–80.
87. See id. at 2679.
88. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
89. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2682 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Oddly, Chief
Justice Roberts cited the AIRC’s counsel’s lack of answer [to what?] as support for his claim that
the majority “judicial[ly]” amended the Constitution. See id. (highlighting a brief dialogue
between Justice Samuel Alito and the AIRC’s counsel at oral argument).
90. See id. at 2690 (“Yet the Court refused to accept ‘that the Framers spent significant time
and energy in debating and crafting Clauses that could be easily evaded.’” (quoting U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 831 (1995)).
91. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (House Qualifications Clause), and id. § 3, cl. 3
(Senate Qualifications Clause), with id. § 4 (Elections Clause).
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could override voter-intiative-enacted constitutional provisions
regulating federal elections under the majority’s reasoning.92 Yet the
majority disagreed with that case’s value as precedent, remarking that
courts generally hold that state legislation in direct conflict with that
state’s constitution is void.93 The dissent also dismissed concerns over
upending other initiative-created electoral laws as beyond the scope of
the case.94
Concluding his dissent, the Chief Justice acknowledged the people’s
concerns over their redistricting process but, “for better or worse,”
offered no judicial recourse in his interpretation of the Elections Clause.95
Rather, he encouraged redistricting advocates to pursue reform via
Congress or the constitutional amendment process96—a highly unlikely
proposition given the current, highly partisan era. While this dissent is
thought-provoking, the majority opinion, which relied on both legal
precedent and historical record, is more practical and provides the best
solution for this issue.
III. INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING REFORM SURVIVES—WHAT
NOW?
In whole, Arizona State Legislature kept the Pandora’s Box of
partisan gerrymandering closed in Arizona, and likely nationwide. The
majority’s legal discussion and reliance on historical record demonstrates
that the Elections Clause should not be interpreted in a way that permits
state legislatures to manipulate the Clause to retain their redistricting, and
consequently gerrymandering, powers. Rather, the Clause’s inclusion in
the U.S. Constitution was to protect the people against those very forms
of political abuse. Although “[t]he Framers may not have imagined the
modern initiative process” at the time,97 allowing initiative-based,
independent redistricting commissions perfectly aligns with the goals of
the Constitution.
The majority also provided proponents of redistricting reform a more
concrete legal ground to stand upon. Many redistricting-reform advocates
praised the Court’s decision.98 Voters in states possessing various forms
92. See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2685–86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing
Baldwin v. Trowbridge, 2 Bartlett Contested Election Cases, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 152, 41st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1866)).
93. See id. at 2674 (majority opinion).
94. See id. at 2691 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2692.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2674 (majority opinion).
98. See, e.g., Bill Chappell, Supreme Court Backs Arizona’s Redistricting Commission
Targeting Gridlock, NPR (June 29, 2015, 8:12 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2015/06/29/418521823/supreme-court-backs-arizonas-redistricting-commission-targeting-gri
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of redistricting commissions could breathe a sigh of relief after the
ruling.99 In particular, California’s voter-approved commission would not
have survived a constitutional challenge under the dissent’s interpretation
of the Elections Clause.100 A federal court later relied on Arizona State
Legislature to uphold California’s commission.101 The Court’s decision
has also inspired challenges to partisan congressional gerrymanders. In
Wisconsin, challengers to that state’s political map filed a complaint in
federal court after the Supreme Court’s decision, on grounds that the map
was overtly partisan.102 Partly due to the dicta in Arizona State
Legislature, this case will likely reach the Supreme Court, which will
finally have the opportunity to rule whether partisan gerrymanders are
constitutional. If Arizona State Legislature is any indicator, the Court
could finally press forward in ending this undemocratic practice.
However, the Court might take a more nuanced approach, as a decision
outright ending the practice would drastically increase litigation over
whether states’ district maps are valid. Depending on the new
composition of the Supreme Court, this is likely to be a narrow five-tofour decision.
Additionally, Arizona State Legislature gave the green light for
several states to continue pursuing their own independent reforms. Before
the decision, Ohio’s legislature had passed a series of redistricting
reforms that required the approval of Ohio voters, but that vote was
stalled due to the litigation surrounding the AIRC.103 After the Supreme
Court’s ruling, Ohio’s redistricting-reform package was overwhelmingly
voted into law the following November election.104 Democratic-leaning
dlock; Lachman, supra note 14.
99. See Tarini Parti, Supreme Court Upholds Arizona Redistricting Committee, POLITICO
(June 29, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/arizona-redistricting-commission
-supreme-court-voting-119543 (listing states with redistricting commissions); Taylor, supra note 23
(discussing the states that could have been forced to redraw lines if the Court decided the case
differently).
100. See Savage, supra note 19.
101. Dewitt v. Ryan, No. C 15-05261 WHA, 2016 WL 127291, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12,
2016) (dismissing a claim that California’s redistricting commission was unconstitutional).
102. See Complaint at 1–2, Whitford v. Nichol, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2015 WL 7294549
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 17, 2015) (No. 3:cv-00421-bbc); Louis Weisberg, Case to Overturn Wisconsin’s
Overtly Partisan Political Districts Moves One Step Forward in Court, WIS. GAZETTE (Oct. 3, 2015),
http://wisconsingazette.com/2015/10/03/case-to-overturn-wisconsins-gerrymandered-legislativedistricts-moves-forward/. Although there were questions as to whether the case could even proceed
on standing grounds, the federal court hearing Whitford denied a motion to dismiss, allowing the
cause of action to proceed. See Whitford, 2015 WL 9239016, at *1.
103. Jackie Borchardt, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Clears the Way for Ohio Congressional
Redistricting Reform, CLEVELAND.COM (June 29, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/
open/index.ssf/2015/06/us_supreme_court_ruling_clears.html.
104. Siegel, supra note 34.
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states with their own gerrymanders are also likely to face voter-initiative
efforts to pass independent redistricting reform. For example, there are
already efforts underway in states such as Illinois and Maryland.105
Other courts have also adopted the Supreme Court’s reasoning that
partisan gerrymanders are not compatible with democracy. For example,
in ordering the adoption of a map to remedy an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander in Virginia,106 one federal court rejected an argument that
the replacement map had to maintain the same partisan makeup as the
legislature’s original map, using the Arizona State Legislature
reasoning.107 Another federal court noted that the Court’s decision could
give gerrymandering “an expiration date.”108 Finally, in litigation over
Florida’s Fair Districts voter initiative, the Florida Supreme Court
adopted principles from the Arizona State Legislature majority in
defending the initiative.109 Recognizing the importance of independent
reform in the context of democratic principles, the Florida Supreme Court
set an example for other state courts to follow. Because Florida voters
enacted these guidelines, a constitutional challenge to their validity
should not be successful under the principles the Arizona State
Legislature majority established. Granted, there are differences between
the AIRC and the Florida initiative, as the latter only restricts the state
legislature’s redistricting power and does not outright abolish it. Yet
Arizona State Legislature’s importance in preventing the Florida
initiative from being struck down should not be understated. In a scenario
in which the dissent’s principles prevailed, the Court might have struck
down the Florida initiative’s restrictions on the legislature’s redistricting
power. However, because voters are able to completely remove a state
legislature’s redistricting power, they should a fortiori be able to restrict
that power. Notably, in the months after the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision, no challenge to the Florida initiative has surfaced.
105. Gabrielle Levy, Redistricting Reform Gains Steam, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 1, 2015, 12:01 AM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/12/01/redistricting-reform-gains-steam. In fact, the
redistricting effort in Illinois is facing resistance. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that an initiative
placing independent redistricting reform on the ballot was unconstitutional under the Illinois
Constitution. See Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. Of Elections, No. 121077, 2016 WL 54776601 ¶ 49 (Ill.
Aug. 25, 2016).
106. Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13cv678, 2015 WL 3604029, at *18–19 (E.D.
Va. June 5, 2015), appeal dismissed sub nom. Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732 (2016).
107. See Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552, 563 (E.D. Va. 2016), stay denied
sub nom. Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 998 (2016).
108. Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 628 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (Cogburn, J.,
concurring), stay pending appeal denied sub nom. McCrory v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 1001 (2016),
prob. juris. noted sub nom. McCrory v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 2512 (2016).
109. See League of Women Voters v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 370 (Fla. 2015) (discussing
Arizona State Legislature).
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Despite these developments, Arizona State Legislature has not
completely clarified the Court’s stance on partisan gerrymandering. After
the decision, courts have recognized that there is some uncertainty
surrounding the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the subject.110 Earlier
in 2015, the Court implied that “political affiliation” was a “traditional
race-neutral districting principle[]” that a legislature could consider in
redistricting.111 Likewise, the Court has struggled to establish a test to
identify when partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional.112 With
Arizona State Legislature, however, the Court has likely adopted a more
aggressive stance on the various legal issues surrounding redistricting.
Immediately after the Arizona State Legislature decision, the Court
agreed to hear another case involving the AIRC, Harris v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission.113 In 2012, the Harris plaintiffs
alleged that the AIRC purposefully overpopulated certain legislative
districts for partisan purposes.114 In a divided opinion, the lower court
held that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that the
AIRC violated the “one-person, one-vote” principle derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that “legitimate considerations” outweighed
any political calculations.115 This became one of the central questions that
the Harris appellants presented to the Supreme Court.116
From several of the Justices’ tones at oral arguments, there seems to
be a growing reluctance to support partisan gerrymandering on the
Court.117 Moreover, the Court has now had the chance to address the issue
110. See, e.g., Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 566 (Payne, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (noting that there is “substantial, and unfortunate, uncertainty present in the Supreme Court’s
decisions respecting the legitimacy, if any, of [partisan] gerrymandering”); Bethune-Hill v. Va.
State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 541 & n.21 (E.D. Va. 2015) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s redistricting decisions).
111. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1270 (2015).
112. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 416–20 (2006)
(Kennedy, J.) (rejecting a proposed test and discussing other previously disavowed tests in past
Court precedent); see also Harris v. McCrory, Case No. 1:13-cv-949, 2016 WL 3129213, at *2
(M.D.N.C. June 2, 2016) (“[I]t may be possible to challenge redistricting plans when partisan
considerations go ‘too far[,]’ . . . [b]ut it is presently obscure what ‘too far’ means.” (citing Cox
v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
113. 135 S. Ct. 2946 (2015).
114. Complaint at 2, Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D.
Ariz. 2012) (No. 2:12CV00894); S.M., The Supreme Court Seems Suddenly Worried About
Partisan Gerrymandering, ECONOMIST: DEMOCRACY IN AM. (Dec. 14, 2015, 7:33 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2015/12/voter-equality.
115. Harris, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 1073, 1079–80.
116. See Brief for Appellants at i, Harris, 135 S. Ct. 2946 (2015) (No. 14-232),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs_2015
_2016/14-232_appellant.authcheckdam.pdf.
117. See S.M., supra note 114 (noting Justice Samuel Alito’s hesitation to affirm his previous
statements supporting the consideration of partisanship in gerrymandering as valid).
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of whether partisan gerrymandering is a legitimate consideration for
redistricting. The Harris district court raised this point, noting that “[t]he
Supreme Court has not [concretely] decided whether or not political gain
is a legitimate state redistricting tool.”118 However, in deciding Harris,
the Court did not determine the legitimacy of partisanship as a
redistricting factor.119 The Court agreed with the district court’s decision
and affirmed the plan, holding that there was not enough evidence to
show that the AIRC’s plan violated the Constitution.120 It determined that
the population variations mainly reflected the AIRC’s “efforts to achieve
compliance with the federal Voting Rights Act, not to secure political
advantage for one party.”121
Although Harris did not decide whether partisanship was an
illegitimate consideration in redistricting, the Court has also accepted
several other redistricting cases.122 In particular, one case centered on
which interpretation of the term “population” should be used in redrawing
districts.123 This case—Evenwel v. Abbott124—slightly differed from
Arizona State Legislature in that the controversy surrounded state
legislative districts.125 In late 2014, the lower federal court rejected the
plaintiffs’ claim that the wide variations in voter population in Texas’s
state legislative districts violated the Equal Protection Clause, even
though the districts had relatively equal total population.126 But like in
Arizona State Legislature, the resolution of this issue depended on the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of constitutional wording in relation to
redistricting issues. The Court recognized as much, since the entire
Evenwel oral argument focused on how past Court precedent interpreted
the word “population.”127 Following the Arizona State Legislature
118. Harris, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
119. Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1309 (2016).
120. Id. at 1305.
121. Id. at 1307.
122. Josh Gerstein, SCOTUS Wrestles with Redistricting Cases, POLITICO: UNDER THE
RADAR (Dec. 8, 2015, 6:35 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2015/12/scotuswrestles-with-redistricting-cases-216569.
123. Robert Barnes, Justices Appear Split in Texas Redistricting Challenge, CHI. TRIBUNE
(Dec. 8, 2015, 5:40 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-supreme-court-oneperson-one-vote-20151208-story.html; Abby Livingston, Texas Redistricting Case Could Have
National Effect, TEX. TRIBUNE (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/12/08/lawyersargue-texas-redistricting-case-/.
124. 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015) (mem.).
125. See Livingston, supra note 123. Predictably, Evenwel has become a hotbed for partisan
battles, similar to Arizona State Legislature. See id.
126. Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 WL 5780507, at *1–2 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 5, 2014).
127. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 4–6, Evenwel, 135 S. Ct. 2349, 2015 WL 9919332 (No. 14940).
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principles would require the Court to hold that a more expansive
interpretation of “population” is required to comply with the one-person,
one-vote requirement. In contrast, a decision following the main Arizona
State Legislature dissent would lead to a citizens-only criterion for
redrawing congressional districts. This approach could potentially lead to
partisan abuse—especially in states without any independent
guidelines—and to extensive litigation over not just redistricting, but the
Census, citizenship, and immigration laws. In fact, the Court ruled that
there was no reason to “upset a well-functioning approach to districting
that all 50 States and countless local jurisdictions have followed for
decades” and kept the total population standard.128 Thus, the Court chose
the more sensible and judicially efficient choice and followed the
practical principles discussed in Arizona State Legislature. In light of the
Harris and Evenwel decisions, the Court may not have a chance to decide
on partisanship in redistricting until after the 2016 presidential election
and a new Supreme Court Justice is appointed.
Upholding these independent redistricting commissions is a strong
step forward in curbing the excesses of partisan gerrymandering, as state
legislatures can be reluctant to enact reform. This reluctance likely stems
in part from states concerned with “unilateral disarmament.” Historically,
both parties have gerrymandered when the chance presented itself,129 and
a Democratic or Republican legislature may hesitate to create an
independent redistricting commission even if the other political party
guarantees nonpartisan redistrcting—similar to a classic prisoner’s
dilemma. Self-preservation for both federal and state legislators also
comes into play, as independent redistricting can result in a different
partisan makeup of the drawn districts. Thus, for reform advocates voter
initiative, if a state permits the process, may be the only option to enact
independent redistricting.
Beyond redistricting reform, the Arizona State Legislature decision
has broader impacts. It preserved other voter initiatives related to election
law, including mail-in ballots and voter ID regulations, on the principle
that they do not violate the Elections Clause.130 Both political parties
should be pleased with this result, as Chief Justice Roberts’s reasoning
might have invalidated many of the parties’ respective priorities enacted
by voter initiative.131 While other constitutional challenges to some of
these laws may succeed, they will not be invalidated based on the
principles stated in Arizona State Legislature.

128.
129.
130.
131.

See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132–33 (2016).
See Draper, supra note 7.
See Parti, supra note 99.
See supra Section II.C.
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CONCLUSION
Overall, Arizona State Legislature halted an effort opposing
independent redistricting reform, especially those enacted by voter
initiative. The majority took a strong stance against partisan
gerrymandering, bringing clarity to the Court’s jurisprudence on the
subject. In doing so, the majority relied on sound precedent and legal
reasoning to reach an outcome that preserved current independentredistricting reforms and offered further possibilities to counter the
abuses of gerrymandering. The case also signals the Court’s shift toward
bringing clarity to redistricting law. The majority’s stance against
partisan gerrymandering is an important step in promoting necessary
independent redistricting reform throughout the United States. With the
next redistricting cycle less than five years away, the clock is ticking.
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